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RECENT JUDICIAL EFFORTS TO RECONCILE THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT WITH THE SHERMAN ACT
PAUL H. LARUE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust commentators and task forces long have scored the
Robinson-Patman Act' (Act) as being in conflict with Sherman Act2 policy
favoring vigorous price competition. 3 Much of the criticism has been di-
rected at Federal Trade Commission and court proceedings under the Act
involving sellers' price discriminations challenged as injurious to competi-
tion with other sellers. Such cases were known as "primary line cases." 4
* Chadwell, Kayser, Ruggles, McGee & Hastings, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois; Ph.B., Univ.
of Wisconsin; J.D., University of Wisconsin.
I The Robinson-Patman Act, enacted in 1936, amended the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1976). The Act prohibits a seller from discriminating in price between different purchasers
in interstate sales of commodities of like grade and quality "where the effect of such discrim-
nation may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with" either the grantor or knowing
recipient of the discrimination or with their customers. Id. § 13(a). The Act provides several
complete defenses to a prima facie case of price discrimination. A price differential is not
illegal if it makes "only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery" resulting from "differing methods or quantities" of sale or delivery; if the differen-
tial resulted from "price changes. . . in response to changing conditions affecting the market
for or the marketability of the goods concerned;" or if the "lower price or the furnishing of
services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor." Id. §
13(a),(b). Other sections forbid the payment or receipt of certain types of brokerage or dis-
counts in lieu thereof, id. § 13(c); require that payments for services or facilities furnished
by a customer or the furnishing of services or facilities to customers be provided on propor-
tionally equal terms to all competing customers, id. § 13(d); and make it unlawful for a buyer
to knowingly induce or receive a prohibited price discrimination. Id. § 13(f).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
3 The basic policy promoted by the Sherman Act in the area of pricing finds expression
in the rule against pricefixing. Under the restraint of trade provision in § 1, any "interference
with the setting of price by free market forces is unlawful per se." United States v. Container
Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969). "The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule
of trade." Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
The Act protects competition at the seller level (which includes the discriminator and
its competitors) (primary line) and at the buyer level as between competing purchasers from
the discriminator (secondary line). The Act's protection of secondary line competition has
been interpreted as reaching down to the fourth level of distribution, i.e., customers of cus-
tomers of customers of the seller. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
325
326 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
The decisions in these cases were often attacked as condemning the very
kind of procompetitive pricing conduct which the Sherman Act seeks to
promote.' At the heart of the criticism was the failure of the Commission
and the courts, in making their competitive effects analyses, to distinguish
between procompetitive and anticompetitive price discriminations.
Conflict with Sherman Act pricing policy has also been perceived in
other Robinson-Patman contexts. A line of court decisions interpreting the
Act's meeting competition defense as warranting exchanges of price infor-
mation among sellers' was criticized as encouraging price fixing.7 And en-
forcement of the Act against buyers in bidding situations was said to have
impeded "hard bargaining" between the seller and buyer.8
Attributing the conflicts to a Robinson-Patman protectionist philoso-
phy at odds with antitrust's main thrust, and believing the Act fundamen-
tally irreconcilable with Sherman Act policy, some critics have urged its
repeal or amendment.' However, Congress has shown no inclination to
repeal or reform the Act due to the fervent support Robinson-Patman
traditionally has received from small businessmen, who regard it as their
Magna Carta.'" Three recent judicial developments indicate, however, that
a substantial reconciliation of the Act with Sherman Act pricing policy
may indeed be achieved through reinterpretation and without the need for
congressional intervention.
The major breakthrough toward reconciliation is the line of decisions
from three federal courts of appeals adopting a marginal-cost test for iden-
I See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTmENT OF JusTIcE REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr
64-74 (1977) [hereinafter cited as JusTIcE REPORT]; REPORT OF THE WHmrE HOUSE TASK FORCE
ON ANTrrRUST PoLicY, 411 ATRR, Special Supplement-Part I1 (May 27, 1969) [hereinafter
cited as NEAL REPORT]; REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PRODUcrIVITY AND COMPErITON, 413
ATRR X-1 (June 10, 1969) [hereinafter cited as STImLE REPoRT]; R. BORK, THE ANTrrRUST
PAnADox, 382-94 (1978) [hereinafter cited as R. BORK]; Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the
Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Bowman];
Liebeler, Let's Repeal It, 45 ANTrTRUST L.J. 14, 27-31 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Liebeler].
I See Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1972); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455
F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1972); Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ala. 1971);
Wall Prod. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Di-wall, Inc. v.
Fibreboard Corp., 1970 TRADE CAS. 73,155 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
7 See JusTcE REPORT, supra note 5, at 60-61 (testimony of Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division). See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978) (Court rejected defense argument that interseller price verification
undertaken to establish meeting competition defense could not be basis of § 1 Sherman Act
price fixing charge); text accompanying notes 13-16 infra.
8 E.g., Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971);
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 99 S.Ct. 925 (1979).
' JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 260-93; NFmL REPORT, supra note 5, at x-3, 9-10,
App. C; STILER REORT, supra note 5, at x-1, 8; R. BORK, supra note 5, at 395; Liebeler, supra
note 5, at 43.
1o REcENT EFFoRTs To AmEND OR REPEAL THE ROBINSON-PATm ACr, A REPORT OF THE An
Hoc SuBcOMMrrrEE ON ANTrrRusT, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr, AND RELATmD MATrERS OF THE
CoMMrrrEE ON SMALL BusIEmsS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. REP. No. 94-1738, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
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tifying anticompetitive price discriminations." This standard, first pro-
posed in 1975 by Professors Areeda and Turner of the Harvard Law
School," addresses the principal source of the statutory conflict, the deter-
mination of a price discrimination's probable effect on competition in pri-
mary line cases.
Another significant step toward a judicial reconciliation of the statutes
is the Supreme Court's landmark decision in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co.'" accommodating Robinson-Patman's meeting compe-
tition defense to Sherman Act price-fixing doctrine. A line of lower court
decisions had held that sellers charged with price fixing under the Sher-
man Act for exchanging price information could avoid liability by showing
that the exchanges were made for the purpose of complying with the
Robinson-Patman Act." In these cases such an exchange allegedly took
place when a seller seeking to come under the Act's meeting competition
defense requested verification of a customer's report of a lower price offer
directly from the competitor who had made'the offer. The courts held that
in certain circumstances direct verification was warranted and constituted
a "controlling circumstance" precluding liability under the Sherman Act.
This "Robinson-Patman defense to a Sherman Act charge" was sharply
criticized as encouraging sellers to exchange price information for the pur-
pose of fixing prices. 5 Agreeing with the government as to "the proper
accommodation of the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts," the Su-
preme Court in Gypsum rejected the defense, holding that price verifica-
tion could be obtained by means short of contacting competitors."
Finally, the Supreme Court has just relaxed Robinson-Patman's re-
straints on seller-buyer price bargaining by holding that if the seller be-
" Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
99 S.Ct. 103 (1978); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
The Janich Bros. decision was preceded in the Ninth Circuit by Hanson v. Shell Oil Co.,
541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), which dealt only with a Sherman Act claim against predatory
conduct. The Hanson case furnished the basis for the government's abandonment of compan-
ion monopoly suits in the tire industry. See Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re:
Upited States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Civ. C-73-836; United States v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., Civ. C-73-835 (N.D. Ohio 1976), reprinted in 5 TmDE REG. REP. (CCH)
50,259 (Feb. 23, 1976).
Several district courts also have applied the marginal-cost test in Robinson-Patman and
Sherman Act litigation involving claims of predatory pricing. E.g., Inglis & Sons Baking Co.
v. rIT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (Robinson-Patman Act);
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D.
Cal. 1978) (Sherman Act); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F. Supp. 847 (N. D. Cal.
1978) (Sherman Act); Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1977) (Sherman Act).
12 Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HAav. L. REv. 697 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Areeda & Turner].
13 98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978).
" See note 6 supra.
,5 E.g., Jusuica REPoRT, supra note 5, at 60-61 (testimony of Thomas E. Kauper, Assist-
ant Attorney General, Antitrust Division).
" 98 S.Ct. at 2879-84.
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lieves its price is only meeting competition, the buyer cannot be liable
under the Act if it knew the seller's price undercut competitors' offersY
The Commission and the Second Circuit had ruled that in such situations
the seller, but not the buyer, was protected by the meeting competition
defense."5
This article will focus on recent decisions adopting the marginal-cost
rule as the appropriate standard for identifying anticompetitive price dis-
criminations in Robinson-Patman primary line cases. The principal objec-
tives will be to demonstrate the prior failure of competitive effects analysis
in primary line cases, and to describe and analyze judicial application of
the marginal-cost test in the specific factual settings presented by the
cases. While no attempt will be made to evaluate the new standard under
economic criteria, a task far better left to the economists, it will be argued
that in terms of Robinson-Patman administration such a standard offers
both an appropriate and workable route to the desired reconciliation with
the Sherman Act.
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
Price discrimination in sales of commodities was first singled out for
express prohibition as an antitrust violation in the Clayton Act of 1914."
That statute represented a congressional response to perceived inadequa-
cies in the Sherman Act following tho Supreme Court's historic decisions
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States0 and United States v. American
Tobacco Co. 21 A widespread belief existed at the time that the great trusts
had employed the predatory practice of localized below-cost price cuts,
subsidized by higher prices in other areas, to drive smaller, local competi-
tors into bankruptcy.2 Believing the Sherman Act inadequate to stop the
practice before monopoly was achieved or imminent, Congress enacted the
Clayton Act to reach such predatory price discriminations "in their inci-
piency" before actual harm to competition had resulted.? In section 2 of
'7 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FrC, 99 S.Ct. 925 (1979).
i Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. 87 F.T.C. 962 (1976), affl'd, 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd,
99 S.Ct. 925 (1979).
" Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
221 U.S. 1 (1911).
21 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
2 According to the House Report on the bill which became the Clayton Act, "Section 2
of the bill" was "expressly designed with the view of correcting and forbidding. . .[a]...
common practice of great and powerful combinations engaged in commerce - notably the
Standard Oil Co., and the American Tobacco Co., and others of less notoriety, but of great
influence - to lower prices of their commodities, oftentimes below the cost of production in
certain communities and sections where they had competition, with the intent to destroy and
make unprofitable the business of their competitors, and with the ultimate purpose in view
of thereby acquiring a monopoly in the particular locality or section in which the discriminat-
ing price is made. . . ." H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914). The Clayton Act
background and the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act are extensively treated
in F. RowE, PmcE DISCRMNATION UNDER THE ROBInMSoN-PATmAN Acr, 3-23 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as F. RowE].
21 See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945).
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the Clayton Act, Congress made it unlawful for a seller to discriminate in
price between different purchasers in interstate sales of commodities of like
grade and quality "where the effect of such discrimination may be substari-
tially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce."24
While section 2 of the original Clayton Act was primarily aimed at price
discriminations injurious to competition at the seller line of commerce
(primary line competition), it also applied to discriminations harmful to
competition at the buyer line (secondary line competition), although it
took a Supreme Court decision to establish the Act's coverage of second-
ary line competition.n But even then the Act contained serious deficien-
cies which greatly reduced its effectiveness.26 When during the 1920's and
30's the Act proved inadequate to stem the rapid growth of the retail food
chains, which were believed to be the beneficiaries of preferential prices
from suppliers, the independent wholesalers and retailers which were
threatened by the chains' expansion looked to Congress for relief. In 1936
Congress responded with passage of the Robinson-Patman Act.2 Amend-
ing section 2 of the Clayton Act, the new Act strengthened that section's
prohibition of price discrimination by, among other things, adding a sec-
ond competitive effects clause.Y The new Act also added sections forbid-
ding "concealed" price discriminations in the form of allowances, services
or brokerage, and added a section imposing liability on buyers who know-
ingly induce or receive prohibited price discriminations. While the
Robinson-Patman Act was mainly oriented toward the protection of sec-
ondary line competition, it also continued the Clayton Act's prohibition of
price discriminations injurious to primary line competition.
29 Most of
Robinson-Patman's clashes with the Sherman Act have occurred in cases
involving price discriminations alleged to be injurious to primary line com-
petition.
III. CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION
A. The Conflict
Economists are generally agreed that some types of price discrimina-
tion promote competition. Indeed, it has been said: "In the vast majority
2 F. RowE, supra note 22, at 6 n.9.
2 George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929).
2 The principal deficiencies were the Act's inapplicability to price differentials based on
quantity differences and its requirement of a showing of general injury to competition in the
proof of a prima facie case of price discrimination. See F. RoWE, supra note 22, at 7, 14-15.
See id. at 8-23.
2 With the addition of the second competitive effects clause, a price discrimination
became prima facie illegal where either the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce" (the original § 2 language) or where
the effect may be "to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
" See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 544 (1960).
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of situations, discriminatory price-cutting - insofar as primary line com-
petition is concerned - will be profitable to the firm concerned and pro-
competitive.""
Two types of price discrimination - sporadic, selective price conces-
sions to retain or gain customers and localized, areawide price cut to gain
entry in a new market - are regarded as particularly effective means of
stimulating competition. Yet both types have been condemned as to par-
ticular sellers and rendered legally hazardous as to all sellers in decisions
under the Robinson-Patman Act.
The competitive aspects of selective price concessions were described
in the 1969 Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy:
In highly concentrated markets, prices may be rigid and a seller
may hesitate to announce price reductions which would be met
immediately by competitors, thus minimizing the seller's increase
in sales. But he may be prepared to make concessions to make
sales to particular buyers. Where such price reductions are spo-
radic and not part of a systematic pattern favoring large purchas-
ers, they may be the first step toward more general price reduc-
tions.3
Professor Adelman has said of this type of price discrimination:
"Sporadic, unsystematic discrimination is one of the most powerful forces
of competition in modem industrial markets. Like a high wind, it seizes
on small openings and crevices in an 'orderly' price structure and tears it
apart."3 In Professor Elzinga's view:
To the extent the cartelist is prevented by the antitrust laws from
cutting a price to a selected buyer, for fear of the Robinson-Patman
Act violation, the cartel has a simpler job of maintaining internal
discipline stability, to the benefit of the price-fixers and the detri-
ment of the industry's consumers.3
This was essentially the kind of selective price cutting condemned by
the Seventh Circuit in Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage
Co. 4 Plaintiff Holleb was a new entrant in the Chicago wholesale frozen
food distribution market, while the defendant Produce Terminal was the
leader in the market. Two years after entry, Holleb's sales had increased
from 0 to $1.3 million, almost 40% beyond its initial projection. However,
Holleb experienced substantial out-of-pocket losses and failed to attract
away from Produce Terminal some large customers to whom the latter had
granted rebates. Holleb brought suit against Produce Terminal alleging
various antitrust violations, including price discrimination in violation of
Areeda & Turner, supra note 12, at 728.
31 NEAL REPoirr, supra note 5, at 9.
12 Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. Rzv. 1289, 1331-
32 (1948) (emphasis in original).
M JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 50-51 (statement of Professor Kenneth G. Elzinga).




The record and briefs show that the rebates to particular customers
challenged by Holleb ranged from 1% to 2% (Holleb's catalog prices were
lower than Produce Terminal's). Produce Terminal's prices were not
shown to be below cost; more favorable purchasing arrangements with
suppliers apparently were responsible for its ability in some instances to
undersell Holleb. As a new entrant with heavy start-up costs, Holleb's
initial losses were not unusual and, in fact, had been anticipated by Hoi-
leb. While Holleb enjoyed substantial sales and market share growth dur-
ing the first two years after entry, during the same period Produce Ter-
minal's sales declined by nearly $3 million.
After trial, the Robinson-Patman and various other claims were sub-
mitted to a jury, which failed to reach a verdict. Subsequently, the district
court dismissed the claims." On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed as
to the Robinson-Patman claim, holding:
From the evidence in the record, a jury could conclude that where
Holleb and Produce Terminal were competing for the same cus-
tomers and where the defendant violated the Clayton Act to obtain
and retain customers, an injury to primary line competition would
result."
Thus, price competition between sellers "to gain and retain customers,"
tfie very market condition which Sherman Act pricing doctrine seeks to
promote, was held to be a Robinson-Patman violation.
Localized, area-wide price-cutting by a seller seeking to expand into
new markets, has been described as "one of the most efficient means of
competitive promotion." Indeed, as explained in the Neal Report, such
limited price cutting may be necessary to gain entry.
A new or potential entrant to a market may find it necessary to
reduce prices below those of his competitors in particular cases in
order to overcome the inertia of established trade relationships.
But the prospective seller may be reluctant to do so if he must
make corresponding reductions to all other purchasers, and he may
decide not to enter."
To the extent the Robinson-Patman Act is interpreted to forbid or
discourage such geographically limited price reductions, the Act becomes
a barrier to entry. Yet, the Supreme Court so interpreted the Act to sustain
a jury's finding of Robinson-Patman violation in Utah Pie Co. v. Continen-
tal Baking Co.4" There, the plaintiff Utah Pie Co., a maker of baked pies
" Id. at 33-34.
" See id. at 31.
= Id. at 35.
Cooper, Price Discrimination Law and Economic Efficiency, 75 MxcH. L. REv. 962, 975
(1977).
' NEAL REPoRr, supra note 5, at 9.
386 U.S. 685 (1967).
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in Salt Lake City, added frozen pies to its product line and quickly
achieved a 66.5% share of the Salt Lake City market. The defendants,
three national concerns, had minor shares of that market and were sub-
stantially in the position of new entrants. In an effort to improve their
shares of the market, the defendants reduced their prices to levels below
their prices in other areas. During the relevant period, Utah Pie's market
share declined to 45.3%, but it increased its sales, continued to be profit-
able, and remained the leader in the market." Despite enhanced compe-
tition in the frozen pie market due to the defendants' pricing tactics, the
Supreme Court held that the jury was warranted in finding competitive
injury.4
2
This is not to suggest, however, that price discrimination can never be
harmful to primary line competition. Where entry barriers are high, a
powerful multi-market seller could drive smaller, local rivals out of the
market with drastic, below-cost price reductions, and thereafter raise its
prices to non-competitive levels. But economists generally are agreed that
proven cases of predatory price discrimination of this kind are extremely
rare. 3 A number of economic studies have shown that reputed predators
either had not engaged in such conduct or, where they had, it had produced
no significant anticompetitive effects. For example, in a celebrated study
of the 1911 Standard Oil case, Professor McGee found that Standard Oil
had not actually employed predatory, localized price cuts in achieving
monopoly power."
Nevertheless, many economists believe that the danger of predatory
price discrimination does exist, and that this danger is a proper concern
of antitrust legislation and policy. 5 On the other hand, they view price
discriminations which are not predatory, that is, discriminations which do
not involve drastically below-cost prices intended to cripple or destroy a
smaller competitor, as usually more beneficial than harmful to competi-
tion. 6
B. Source of the Conflict:
The Failure of Robinson-Patman Primary
Line Injury Analysis
In construing Robinson-Patman's competitive effects language, the
courts have stressed that "the statute does not require that the discrimina-
tions must in fact have harmed competition, but only that there is a
"1 Id. at 689.
12 Id. at 702-03.
43 See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, supra note 12, at 699.
1, McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. OF L. & ECON.
137 (1958).
11 R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 15 (1976) [hereinafter cited as R. POSNER];
Areeda & Turner, supra note 12, at 697.
" R. BORK, supra note 5, at 395, 398; R. POSNER, supra note 45, at 12-15; Areeda &
Turner, supra note 12, at 728.
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reasonable possibility that they 'may' have such an effect."'" What is re-
quired of the FTC and the courts, then, is a prediction of a discrimination's
likely future effects on competition. The process of prediction involves the
drawing of inferences from contemporary data pertaining to the discrimi-
nation. The difficulty of the task was explained in United States v. Phila-
delphia National Bank'8 with respect to the similar competitive effects
language of section 7 of the Clayton Act pertaining to mergers:
Clearly, this is not the kind of question which is susceptible of a
ready and precise answer in most cases. It requires not merely an
appraisal of the immediate impact of the merger upon competi-
tion, but a prediction of its impact upon competitive conditions in
the future ... .
For nearly forty years, from 1936 to 1975, the FTC and the courts
struggled to make the required prediction of the competitive consequences
of challenged price discriminations. Their effort was severely handicapped
by the absence of meaningful and workable standards for distinguishing
between pro and anticompetitive price discriminations in a primary line
context.
Most of the primary line cases resulting in ultimate liability involved
price discriminations found to be predatory. 0 Predation was found either
by direct evidence of the discriminator's intent or inferentially from below-
cost prices. Cases of the latter type involved a double inference: "From
below-cost pricing, predatory intent is inferred; from the finding of preda-
tion, injury to competition is inferred.""1 This line of cases failed to pro-
duce, however, any well-defined meanings for the terms "predatory" and
"below-cost."
Standards applied by the FTC in cases involving discriminations which
were not predatorily motivated proved faulty or unworkable. At one time
the Commission equated the temporary diversion of business from compet-
itors to the discriminator with injury to competition. Commission findings
of injury based on this standard were made in Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co.12 and Anheuser-Busch, Inc.," but the findings were set aside
on appeal.- In Anheuser-Busch, the court noted that diversion of business
, See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945).
374 U.S. 321 (1963).
"Id. at 362.
E.g., Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co.,
269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC,
243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957); E.B. Mueller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944); Porto
Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279
U.S. 858 (1929).
5, Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 798 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
52 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948).
53 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957).
" Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert.
1979]
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from one seller to another is inevitable in the competitive process and,
indeed, is the very essence of competition.5
A more elaborate formula for assessing the injury potential of a discrim-
ination was devised by the Commission in the 1965 Dean Milk Co. case. 6
There, the Commission stated that a finding of possible injury to primary
line competition is warranted in the absence of predation upon a showing
of significant diversion of business from competitors or a reduction in their
profits, provided that these portend a financial crippling of competitors or
structural changes in the market.57 But findings of the Commission based
on the application of this complex and speculative test did not hold up on
appeal. 8
The failure of primary line injury analysis during the pre-1975 period
is dramatically demonstrated by the Supreme Court's opinion in Utah Pie
Co. v. Continental Baking Co. 9 Plaintiff Utah Pie was a local maker of
baked pies in Salt Lake City which added frozen pies to its line. The
defendants, three national concerns, were already in the market. With
entry prices lower than the defendants', and the advantage of being a local
concern, plaintiff quickly achieved dominance with a 66.5% share of the
market. The defendants, who had been reduced to minor market shares,
sought to improve their positions by reducing their prices. Vigorous price
competition ensued in which each party took the initiative in cutting
prices, although plaintiffs prices were the lowest most of the time. The
defendants' reductions made their prices in Salt Lake City lower than in
other areas in which they did business, which formed the basis of plaintiffs
claim of geographic price discrimination. With a substantial increase in
the total volume of frozen pie sales during the relevant period, plaintiffs
sales more than doubled, it realized a profit each year, and its net worth
doubled. Although its market share declined to 45.3%, plaintiff remained
the leader in the market.10
Desite this evidence of competitive health in the market, the Supreme
Court upheld a jury verdict finding defendants in violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act. The Court held that the jury's finding that defen-
dants' price discriminations had the requisite ill-effect on competition was
supported by the evidence. First, the Court said there was evidence from
which the jury could attribute a predatory intent to each defendant,
including evidence of below-cost sales by each of them." Second, the Court
held that, even absent the element of predation, the jury's finding of com-
petitive injury was supported by the evidence of a "drastically declining
dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961)
(decision after remand from Supreme Court).
5 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1961).
FA 68 F.T.C. 710 (1965).
" Id. at 750.
" Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968).





price structure" in the market, which could be attributed to the defen-
dants' price discriminations. 2
The decision evoked immediate and caustic criticism. One critic la-
beled the decision "the most anticompetitive antitrust decision of the de-
cade." 3 The Court was faulted for failing to furnish an "intelligible ration-
ale" of primary line injury,6" and for resolving the injury issue on the basis
of the discrimination's impact on an individual competitor. 5 The Court's
failure to define a "below-cost" price, which it cited as evidence of predar
tion, was criticized,6 as was the Court's reliance on declining prices in-the
market (generally regarded as the hallmark of effective competition) 'as
evidence of the anticompetitive potential of the discriminations.67  ,.;
Utah Pie's legacy was conflict and chaos. Pricing tactics which had
broken a local monopoly, while leaving the former monopolist a viable hnd
effective competitor, were condemned as a Robinson-Patman violation.
Lower courts were left free to infer predatory intent, and from that to infer
competitive injury, from price discriminations involving prices below cost
under any accounting standard. Sellers seeking to gain market entry
through localized price reductions were placed in jeopardy whenever local
competitors were likely to meet their prices and bring down the market
price. As if to underscore the confusion, in a subsequent primary line case
before the FTC, 6 the five commissioners split four ways on probable com-
pptitive effect, with all drawing "support from the Utah Pie opinion." 69.
C. The Areeda and Turner Proposal
Eight years after the Utah Pie decision, Professors Areeda and Turner
published their article in the Harvard Law Review which applied the ana-
lytical tools of economics to the predatory pricing question in the context
of both Sherman Act section 2 and Robinson-Patman primary line injury.70
Observing that "[a] firm which drives out or excludes rivals by selling at
unremunerative prices is not competing on the merits, but engaging in
behavior that may properly be called predatory,"71 they proposed cost-
based rules with marginal cost as the touchstone for distinguishing be-
tween predatory and competitive pricing.
2
12 Id. at 703.
93Bowman, supra note 5, at 84.
" Austern, Presumption and Percipience About Competitive Effect Under Section 2 of
the Clayton Act, 81 HIv. L. Rzv. 773, 784 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Auster].
65 Bowman, supra note 5, at 73.
" R. PosNER, supra note 45, at 38.
n JusTIcE REPoRT, supra note 5, at 69 (statement of Paul H. LaRue).
"National Dairy Prod. Corp., 71 F.T.C. 1333 (1967), modified, 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir.
1969).
"Austern, supra note 64, at 784.
70 Areeda & Turner, supra note 12.
7' Id. at 697.
72 Id. at 732-33. Announcement of the Areeda and Turner marginal cost rules evoked a
spirited debate in the pages of the Harvard Law Review. See Scherer, Predatory Pricing and
the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 869 (1976); Areeda & Turner, Scherer on
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Professors Areeda and Turner point out that "the classically-feared
case of predation has been the deliberate sacrifice of present revenues for
the purpose of driving rivals out of the market and then recouping the
losses through higher profits earned in the absence of competition." 3 Two
prerequisites for successful predation, they note, are the predator's greater
financial staying power than its rivals and the existence of very high entry
barries 4
Professors Areeda and Turner conclude that "marginal-cost pricing is
the economically sound division between acceptable, competitive behavior
and 'below-cost' predation.""' Because the worst case is thereby presented,
the test is to be applied to a "monopolist." 6 Under the test, a monopolist
should not be considered to be acting predatorily when pricing at or above
marginal cost. Marginal-cost pricing is tolerable for the reasons, among
others, that it "leads to a proper resource allocation and is consistent with
competition on the merits." On the other hand, "as a general rule, a
monopolist pricing below marginal cost is engaged in a predatory or exclu-
sionary practice." 8 Such a firm is incurring some out-of-pocket losses, it
is wasting social resources "when marginal costs exceed the value of what
is produced," and the possibility is greatly increased that "rivalry will be
extinguished or prevented for reasons unrelated to the efficiency of the
monopolist." An exception is recognized when marginal cost exceeds av-
erage cost, in the unusual situation in which the monopolist is seeking to
meet excess demand, since any adverse effect probably would be mini-
mal.8
Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HAv. L. REV. 891 (1976). Other criticism appeared in Wil-
liamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977) and
R. POSNER, ANTTRUST LAw 189 (1976).
Professors Areeda and Turner subsequently published their marginal-cost rules, with
some modifications, in their text on antitrust law. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, III ANTrUsT LAw
150-91 (1978) [hereinafter cited as P. AREEDA & D. TURNER]. The subsequent discussion of
the rules in this article is cited to this text.
3 P. AREDA & D. TURNER, supra note 72, at 151.
74 Id.
11 Id. at 172. "Marginal cost" is defined as "the increment to total cost that results from
producing as additional increment of output." Id. at 155.
"1 Professors Areeda and Turner explain their use of the term "monopolist" on the basis
that "without both greater staying power than potential victims and the prospect of achieving
and exploiting a monopoly, predation would ordinarily be irrational and may therefore be
presumed absent, unless a contrary showing is made." Id. at 153 n.11. Thus, Areeda and
Turner conclude:
If the Sherman Act is properly interpreted to permit a monopolist to discriminate
in price so long as his lower price equals or exceeds marginal cost, such discrimina-
tion is a fortiori permissible for firms with lesser degrees of market power, and the
Robinson-Patman Act should be interpreted no differently in primary-line cases
unless the statutory language or compelling legislative history dictates otherwise.
Id. at 190. They see neither statutory language nor compelling legislative history which would
dictate a different interpretation. Id.






In applying these rules, future costs rather than past accounting costs
may be employed. Due to the difficulty of ascertaining a firm's marginal
cost from ordinary business records, "average variable cost" is used as a
substitute.8' The test is then put as follows:
(2) (A) A price at or above reasonably anticipated average variable
cost should be presumed lawful.
(B) A price below reasonably anticipated average variable cost
should be conclusively presumed unlawful.2
Professors Areeda and Turner would apply the test to "price discrimi-
nation, whether between different geographic markets or in the same mar-
ket, except that a monopolist should have the benefit of any defen-
ses-such as 'promotional' pricing or 'meeting competition'-available to
other sellers in any market in which he lacks monopoly power."
D. Judicial Adoption of the Test
The courts have been quick to adopt the Areeda and Turner test both
for Sherman Act section 2 and Robinson-Patman primary line injury anal-
ysis. To date, the courts of appeals of three federal circuits (Fifth, Ninth
and Tenth)84 and several district courts have applied the test."
The rulings of the courts of appeals are revealing on a number of signifi-
cant matters in evaluating the future course of primary line adjudications
under the Act. First, there are differences among the circuits as to the force
to be given proof, or the absence of proof, of sales below average variable
cost. Second, the plaintiff in such a case is likely to have a difficult, but
not impossible, task of obtaining the necessary cost data. Third, "direct
evidence" of predatory intent, such as memoranda recommending action
to reduce a competitor's profitability, will be given little or no weight by
the courts. Finally, if the three circuit court decisions are typical, only
81 Id. at 153-54. "Variable costs" are defined as "costs that vary with changes in output.
They typically include such items as materials, fuel, labor directly used to produce the
product, indirect labor such as foremen, clerks, and custodial help, use-depreciation, repair
and maintenance, and per unit royalties and license fees. The average variable cost is the
sum of all variable costs divided by output." Id. at 155.
Id. at 154.
'Id.
Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
99 S.Ct. 103 (1978); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
11 See, e.g., Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410
(N.D. Cal. 1978); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458
F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1977). But see Borden's, Inc., 3 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490 (Nov. 7, 1978) (where strength of Borden's ReaLemon trademark
created high entry barrier, Borden prices could be predatory even though above marginal-
cost). Significantly, the Inglis decision, rendered by the Northern District of California after
the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the marginal-cost test in Hanson and Janich Bros., overruled
a prior ruling in that case rejecting the test. 461 F. Supp. at 417 n.5.
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rarely will a defendant's prices be shown to be below average variable cost
and primary line injury found.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distill-
ing Co."' most closely embraces the Areeda and Turner test. Although the
issue of the test's applicability was faced directly only with respect to a
Sherman Act claim, the decision inferentially holds the test applicable in
a Robinson-Patman primary line injury context. In Janich Bros. the plain-
tiff had charged the defendant American Distilling with having sold li-
quor at below-cost prices in violation of Sherman Act section 2, and at
geographically discriminatory prices in violation of that section and the
Robinson-Patman Act. Janich complained that as a result of these prac-
tices it had been precluded from selling private label liquor to large chain
stores, and had suffered a loss of customers and reduced sales to existing
customers. American Distilling won a directed verdict on the Sherman Act
claim, and a favorable jury verdict on the Robinson-Patman claim. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed.
On appeal, Janich attacked primarily the directed verdict on the Sher-
man Act claim. Insofar as the directed verdict was based on geographic
price discrimination, the court ruled, any error of the trial judge was harm-
less. Stating that Sherman Act section 2 and the Robinson-Patman Act
have the same competitive effects requirement, the Ninth Circuit pointed
out that since the jury in deciding the section 2(a) issue had found no
substantial effect on competition, it necessarily would have reached the
same result had the section 2 claim been submitted to it.87
With respect to the directed verdict's application to the issue of below-
cost pricing, the court found that Janich had not produced sufficient evi-
dence to go to the jury. Adopting the Areeda and Turner formulation
almost without reservation, the court explained: "[A]n across-the-board
price set at or above marginal cost should not ordinarily form the basis for
an antitrust violation. 8 8 Since the only evidence of costs produced by
Janich were price lists showing "cost of merchandise sold," which did not
differentiate between fixed and variable costs, it was not possible to deter-
mine if American Distilling's prices were below average variable cost. Ac-
cordingly, the court held that a directed verdict had properly been entered
for defendant American Distilling. 9
The Fifth Circuit's adoption of the Areeda and Turner test in
International Air Industries v. American Excelsior Co."0 was limited to the
proof necessary to sustain a plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict. There,
the plaintiff Vebco had been a distributor of the defendant AMXCO's air
conditioner pads in the El Paso-Las Cruces market. Vebco decided to enter
the market with cooler pads of its own manufacture, and shortly thereafter
challenged AMXCO, the dominant conern in the market, by reducing its
" 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 855.
" Id. at 857.
Id. at 858-59.
517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975).
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price. AMXCO responded with two succesive price cuts, both of which
were met by Vebco. Unable to sustain the low price, based on a discount
of 32.5%, Vebco increased its price and AMXCO eventually followed suit.
Vebco then filed suit under Sherman Act section 2 and the Robinson-
Patman Act. The crux of Vebco's complaint under the Robinson-Patman
Act was that AMXCO's El Paso-Las Cruces prices were lower than its
prices in other areas, resulting in geographic price discrimination. A jury
found for AMXCO on both claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
On appeal, Vebco's principal contention was that the district court
had erred in refusing to direct a verdict in its favor on the Robinson-
Patman claim. The Fifth Circuit first concluded that, absent predation,
injury to competition could not be found. Citing AMXCO's market share
decline, and the growth of Vebco and other competitors, it viewed the
market as "far more competitive after the discrimination than before.""1
The diversion of business and loss of profits claimed by Vebco were re-
jected as indicia of primary line competitive injury.92 As to the latter
claim, the court stated that "[m]ere loss of profits shows no more than
that Vebco was forced to charge a competitive price because it faced
competition."93
The court in International Air Industries was equally unable to find
predation. An AMXCO memorandum indicating a policy of "stunting"
Vebco's growth was deemed insufficient. 4 The court stated that since the
allegedly harmful conduct involved pricing, it was necessary to examine
the relationship between AMXCO's prices and costs in order to determine
whether its price behavior was predatory. To determine whether there was
predatory pricing, the court proceeded to apply the Areeda and Turner
analysis. Athough it felt the Areeda and Turner test should be relevant in
determining whether a prima facie case of price discrimination has been
proved, the court was concerned that the Supreme Court might have set a
lesser standard in Utah Pie by its reference in that case to a "deteriorating
price structure." Accordingly, the court limited its holding to the elements
necessary to sustain a motion for a directed verdict, 5 ruling that:
• ..in order to prevail as a matter of law, a plaintiff must at least
show that either (1) a competitor is charging a price below his
average variable cost in the competitive market or (2) the competi-
tor is charging a price below its short-run, profit-maximizing price
and barriers to entry are great enough to enable the discriminator
to reap the benefits of predation before new entry is possible. 9
While evidence of AMXCO's costs had not been "cogently" presented
at trial, upon a "thorough examination" of the record the court of appeals
"Id. at 722 n.14.
'3Id. at 721-22.
,3 Id. at 722.
" Id. at 723.
" Id. at 724 n.30.
" Id. at 724.
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determined that the trial judge had access to much of the relevant cost
data." Finding that AMXCO's prices were far above even its average cost,
and that barriers to entry in the southwestern cooler pad market were
virtually.nonexistent, the court concluded that AMXCO's pricing had
been procompetitive. 8
The impact of the Areeda and Turner test on Robinson-Patman pri-
mary line injury analysis can best be measured by contrasting the facts
and result of International Air Industries with those of Holleb & Co. v.
Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co.99 The plaintiff in each suit was a new
entrant in the market who complained of discounting by the defendant to
gain or retain customers for whose patronage both companies were compet-
ing. Both plaintiffs enjoyed sales and market share gains during the com-
plaint period. Both complained of "diversion of business" and reduced or
lost profits. The defendant in each case experienced either a decline in
sales volume or market share. Despite substantially similar facts in each
case, however, opposite results were reached.
The Tenth Circuit in Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp."'' seems to have been the most hesitant in embracing the
Areeda and Turner test, stating only that evidence of marginal cost or
average varible cost is "extremely beneficial" in establishing predatory
pricing and adding that it was not adopting "a solely cost-based test."''
There, the plaintiff Pacific Engineering and the defendant AMPOT were
the two remaining competitors in the ammonium perchlorate industry,
which during the relevant period was experiencing falling demand and
excess capacity."2 Following a period of price decline, Pacific Engineer-
ing-the smaller producer-filed suit against AMPOT alleging violation of
Sherman Act section 2 and the Robinson-Patman Act. The district court
entered judgment for Pacific Engineering on both claims.", The' Tenth
Circuit reversed. With respect to the Sherman Act section 2 charge, the
Tenth Circuit stated that the fundamental issue was whether AMPOT had
engaged in predatory price-cutting. Referring to the Areeda and Turner
article, and to Professor Sherer's criticism of their proposed rules, the court
expressed its belief that "evidence of marginal cost or average variable cost
is extremely beneficial in establishing a case of monopolization through
predatory pricing."'04 Pointing out that the trial court had found that
AMPOT's sales were always at prices above average variable and marginal
" Id. at 725.
Id.
532 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1976).
551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
"' Id. at 797.
102 Ammonium perchlorate is a chemical used almost exclusively as an oxidizer in solid
rocket fuel that is purchased by missile manufacturers for NASA and the Department of
Defense. Demand fell off when NASA converted from solid to liquid rocket fuel and defense
appropriations were diverted from missile programs to the Viet Nam war effort. Id. at 791-
92.
", 1974-1 TaDE CAs. 75,054 (D. Utah 1974).
551 F.2d at 797.
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cost, and that various other "predatory" practices employed by AMPOT
had inflicted no independent harm, the court ruled that AMPOT had not
engaged in predatory pricing."5
The Robinson-Patman claim related to discrimination resulting from
AMPOT's lower bid prices to large purchasers than its list prices to small
purchasers. In disposing of this claim, the court stated that as it applies
to primary line injury, the Robinson-Patman Act should be interpreted no
differently than the Sherman Act."' The court then referred to the "double
inference test." "From below cost pricing, predatory intent is inferred;
from the finding of predation, injury to competition is inferred," and con-
cluded that since the first inference was lacking, there was no basis for the
second.'07
The court acknowledged that its ruling led "to the somewhat untoward
result that the larger of two competitors will survive while the smaller may
expire."'0 0 However, this made no difference, since "[t]he Robinson-
Patman Act was intended to provide small businesses with protection from
abuses by large, powerful business, but legitimate price competition is not
such an abuse."''
As of the date this article was written, the Areeda and Turner test had
not been rejected by any circuit which had considered it. In the three
circuits which have adopted the test, despite the different analytical ap-
proaches taken, it seems clear that plaintiffs in Robinson-Patman primary
line cases will have to be prepared to show that the defendants' prices were
below average variable cost. A modification of plaintiffs burden in the
Fifth Circuit," and possible modification in the Ninth Circuit,"' is a show-
ing that the defendant's price, while above average variable cost, was
below its short-run profit-maximizing price and that entry barriers were
exceedingly high. In the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff may as an alternative
show "other relevant factors" than pricing below average variable cost to
establish that the defendant's prices were anticompetitive."'
Several common themes were sounded by the three circuits in the cases
reviewed which have profound implications for the future course of
Robinson-Patman enforcement. All three circuits have adopted the Areeda
and Turner view that where a price discrimination threatens primary line
injury, the Robinson-Patman Act and Sherman Act section 2 are directed
at the same evil and have the same substantive content. Therefore, in such
situations the two statutes are to be construed similarly.
10 Id.
"' Id. at 798.
107 Id.
"I Id. at 799.
10 Id.
"0 International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d at 714, 724 (5th Cir.
1975); see text accompanying notes 90-99 supra.
"I Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1976); see text accompanying
notes 86-89 supra.
"1 551 F.2d at 797.
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The three circuits also agree that the antitrust laws-including the
Robinson-Patman Act-were not intended to subsidize the inefficient.
They are not to be enforced to shelter individual competitors against com-
petition. Where a seller is pricing at a remunerative price, therefore, it is
no concern of the antitrust laws that a less efficient competitor may suffer
financial or customer losses or even be driven from the market.
Finally, the three circuits apparently will give little or no weight to
"direct" evidence of predatory intent. At least where the issue is whether
a directed verdict was properly entered, memoranda and oral statements
manifesting aggressive designs against the plaintiff probably will be disre-
garded as showing only what the defendant might have done and not what
it actually did.
E. The Case for a Marginal-Cost Test
The adoption of the Areeda and Turner test by three circuits presently
reflects only a trend. To be sure, it is a strong trend since to date all federal
circuits which have considered the test have adopted it. Nevertheless, the
issue has not yet reached the Supreme Court and that Court's Utah Pie
decision remains its last word on the subject of primary line injury.
A number of policy considerations recommend adoption of the
marginal-cost test for Robinson-Patman primary line injury analysis. They
relate to reconciliation of the Act both with economic teachings and with
over-all antitrust policy.
A Meaningful distinction between pro and anticompetitive
discrimination
The marginal-cost test is, first of all, meaningful in that it employs the
tools of economics to distinguish between pro and anticompetitive price
discriminations and proscribes only the latter. FTC and court devised
injury standards such as "predatory intent," "below-cost," "diversion of
trade," and "deteriorating price structure," having been formulated with-
out reference to specific economic principles, are not useful in distinguish-
ing between pro and anticompetitive price discriminations. Thus, in em-
ploying these criteria the FTC and the courts often have been led to the
anomalous result of condemning procompetitive pricing.
The marginal-cost test is compatible with Robinson-Patman primary
line coverage. In focusing on price discriminations which can realistically
be deemed predatory by virtue of the discriminator's market power and
willingness to sustain short-run losses, the test singles out for condemna-
tion the very type of predatory price discrimination which was the main
concern of Congress in enacting the original section 2 of the Clayton Act
in 1914. Concern with the predatory type of price discrimination was even
behind Congress' inclusion of a second competitive effects clause in the
Robinson-Patman amendment of 1936. As explained by a congressional
sponsor of the amendment, that clause was intended to make the Act apply
where a large concern "with the use of discriminatory prices destroys and
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replaces the local concern as the competitor in the local field. Competition
in the local field generally has not been lessened, since one competitor has
been replaced by another; but competition with the grantor of the discrimi-
nation has been destroyed.'
'13 '
Robinson-Patman's "incipiency" injury standard does not preclude use
of a standard which recognizes only "predatory" discriminations; that is,
price discriminations involving prices below marginal or average variable
costs, as harmful to competition. As explained by Professors Areeda and
Turner, "[hf marginal-cost pricing cannot reasonably be construed as a
'lessening of competition,' the 'may be' issue is never reached. '1
It might be contended that the marginal-cost test is incompatible with
Robinson-Patman's populist goals."' The question of competitive injury is
resolved under the test on the basis of corporate efficiency; competitive
injury is recognized only when the discriminator's price has reached a
below-cost level which injures equally efficient rivals. Under the test, com-
petitive injury is not recognized when only less efficient competitors are
harmed. The Robinson-Patman Act has been characterized, on the other
hand, as intended to protect the small and weak against the large and
powerful in the interest of maintaining an economy consisting of a large
number of individual entrepreneurs."' Whatever may be said for this view-
point, the antitrust laws-including the Robinson-Patman Act-were not
intended to penalize competitive gains achieved through greater efficiency.
As Judge Learned Hand taught us in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America,"7 a company has not violated the antitrust laws if monopoly
power has been "thrust upon" it "by virtue of [its] superior skill, foresight
and industry.""' The Robinson-Patman Act itself excludes from its prohi-
bitions price discriminations which are cost justified.
To the extent there may be any incompatibility, the Robinson-Patman
Act must be accommodated to the Sherman Act. Supplemental legislation
cannot be permitted to override the legislation to which it is subordinate.
In its most recent decision under the Act, the Supreme Court reminded:
"More than once the Court has stated that the Robinson-Patman Act
should be construed consistently with broader policies of the anti-trust
laws.""'
"3 80 CONG. Rac. 9417 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Utterbach).
"' P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 72, at 190.
,' For an excellent discussion of the populist values said to underlie the antitrust laws,
see Antitrust Policy-Populist Philosophy of Economic Necessity?, Remarks by Hon. John
H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the Los Angeles County
Bar Ass'n (Jan. 30, 1978).
III This viewpoint was expressed with respect to Clayton Act § 7 (mergers) in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) where Chief Justice Warren pointed out that in
enacting § 7, Congress desired "to promote competition through the protection of viable,
small, locally owned businesses." Id. at 344. This statement has been criticized as an example
of protectionist thinking representing an attack on efficiency which has no place in antitrust.
Liebeler, supra note 5, at 70-71.
" 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
"' Id. at 430.
"' Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 99 S. Ct. 925, 933 n. 13 (1979) (citations omitted).
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The test is workable
The Supreme Court has recognized that predictions of future competi-
tive conditions based on appraisals of economic data are "most ill-suited
for ascertainment by courts," which are "unequipped for it either by expe-
rience or by the availability of skilled assistance."'' The marginal-cost test
proposed by Professors Areeda and Turner furnishes just such a simplified
and practical test of illegality, eliminating the need for a complex market
analysis. Although certain market data must be produced concerning the
relative size and financial strength of the discriminator, its prices and
costs, and ease of entry into the market, basically a double inference pro-
cess is used. In general, proof that the discriminator's price was below
average variable cost will establish predatoriness which, in turn, will per-
mit an inference of probable competitive injury. To be sure, the burden of
proving the discriminator's costs falls upon the plaintiff. But the cases to
date indicate that this should not present an insurmountable obstacle.
The test will help effect the desired statutory reconciliation
In legitimatizing area price-cuts down to the level of marginal cost, the
marginal-cost standard greatly enlarges the scope of the seller's pricing
freedom. Bereft of the fear of a Robinson-Patman violation, sellers will be
encouraged to compete more vigorously for new markets and customers.
The dynamics of the marketplace, rather than the constraints of the
Robinson-Patman Act, will determine prices. Thus, greater harmony with
section 1 of the Sherman Act will be achieved.
Harmony will also be achieved with section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
marginal-cost standard is for use in determining predatoriness under both
statutes. Professors Areeda and Turner justify this on the ground that
"[t]he basic substantive issues raised by the Robinson-Patman Act's con-
cern with primary-line injury to competition and by the Sherman Act's
concern with predatory pricing are identical."'' The resulting statutory
overlap is not without precedent in our system of antitrust laws; partial or
complete overlap presently exists between Sherman Act section 1 and
Clayton Act section 3 (exclusive dealing and tying clauses)'2 and between
Sherman Act section 1 and Clayton Act section 7 (mergers).'1 Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act is interpreted as embracing all prac-
110 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1949). In a later case, the
Court admonished with respect to the competitive effects test of Clayton Act § 7 (mergers),
that where it is possible to do so without doing violence to the congressional objectives
embodied in the statute, the courts should "simplify the test of illegality ... in the interest
of sound and practical judicial administration." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
121 p. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 72, at 190.
122 See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969)
(application of Sherman Act § 1 to tying of loans to purchase of prefabricated houses).
'2 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (tests of illegality for
mergers under the Sherman and Clayton Acts said to be complementary).
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tices violative of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.' 4 Of course, no overlap
would exist with respect to Robinson-Patman's application to price dis-
criminations affecting secondary line competition and to the Act's sections
relating to brokerage, allowances, services and buyer liability. The protec-
tion of competition at the buyer level was, of course, the main purpose for
which the Act was passed in 1936.
IV. CONCLUSION
Conflict between the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts has been
frequently and convincingly demonstrated. Sound public policy dictates
that the two statutes be brought into harmony. As supplemental legisla-
tion, it is the Robinson-Patman Act which must bear the burden of change.
Given the strong support the Act enjoys in Congress, repeal or amendment
do not appear to be viable solutions. Twice recently the Supreme Court
has resolved conflicts between the two acts with accommodating interpre-
tations of the Robinson-Patman Act. Professors Areeda and Turner and
the courts adopting their test for identifying anticompetitive prices have
shown the way toward elimination of the major source of conflict between
the two statutes. Hopefully, other courts and, ultimately, the Supreme
Court will make this further accommodation necessary to the achievement
of a harmonious and rational antitrust policy with respect to pricing.
"I See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941);
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953).
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